This goes to the question of a better control system. There really is quite a good basis in the system that exists under the IAEA, but as proliferation risks increase to keep weapons out of the hands of, for instance, non-state actors, you'd have to envisage even stricter and more careful controls than we have at present, and it's going to mean more money and more intrusion into national affairs. To give you an example, in a number of countries a civil nuclear power program, which you must assure is just that and not being abused for the purpose of clandestine production of nuclear weapons, might well be in the hands of the private sector. So if you have an international control system, you have to have one that envisages controlling not only governments but the private sector in some countries as well. And there a set of problems arise, additional complications and so on.
That's just one example. But in order to keep weapons out of the hands of non-state actors it really has to be an airtight system, and what we have at the moment, as the history of proliferation originating in Pakistan, for instance, would demonstrate, is by no means airtight.