Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to ask Mr. Fowler another question, and I'd like to frame the question first.
You mentioned in your opening remarks that there are two broad approaches governments have taken to hostage-taking. One is an immutable position, and the other is one that provides some creativity and flexibility, if I recall correctly. I want to explore that a bit.
It seems to me that there are two schools of thought on hostage-taking. One is that you don't negotiate with hostage-takers. You don't pay ransom. You don't do anything, because the argument goes that you would be providing incentives for more of the same. I've read other arguments from people who have done research in this field who argue the opposite. They have said there is no evidence that taking the first immutable position actually reduces incidents of hostage-taking. Some have even argued quite the opposite, that what happened in the Philippines, which you referenced earlier, leads to more incentives because it was broadcast, as you said, on social media around the world millions of times.
Can you give this committee your view on what the evidence points to and what the better approach is when it comes to governments managing hostage-taking and providing incentives and disincentives with respect to hostage-taking? Part one of the bill really is about a punishment regime that transfers the onus from the families of hostage-takers—which is the situation you have when there is an immutable set of principles saying that the government shouldn't do anything—to one where the government has an obligation to punish hostage-takers. It shifts that burden from families to the state. I'd like you to talk a bit about that.