Quickly, regarding the fifth, how we operate the C-17s is what's called three lines of tasking, so that at any given time we have three aircraft available for missions. As these aircraft start to age, the amount of time they have to be in maintenance increases, and there are larger maintenance activities. Looking forward at four, by virtue of overlap of heavy maintenance, we found ourselves in periods where we were going to have basically two-and-a-half lines of operation, which meant two.
From a strategic decision perspective, acquiring the fifth C-17 was to maintain three lines of operation. It was not the fact that we would have more maintainers, but that we would actually be rotating more aircraft through industry as they aged further. That was the rationale, and that's what occurred.
Again, there are periods where we don't always have two in maintenance, we have one, and we go from three to four, even with five. There are periods where, yes, the air force finds itself more aircraft, which it wants to use, I think, for good purposes. However, the rationale was that it took five to maintain three lines of operation. That was why we did that.