Stéphane Bergeron

[Cod Fishing, February 18th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I understand the answer the minister just gave us. However, will the Deputy Prime Minister, the minister or God knows who from the other side of the House, acknowledge the fact that this moratorium will have a limited scope, since Norway and the European Union have refused to support the moratorium other members of NAFO have agreed upon?

[Cod Fishing, February 18th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Deputy Prime Minister. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, NAFO, agreed yesterday to put in place a one-year moratorium on cod fishing in the southern region of the Grand Banks off the coast of Newfoundland. Earlier, I heard my colleague say how delighted he was about it.

Could the government explain why members of NAFO have settled for a one-year moratorium, while Canada was stressing the need for a three-year moratorium in order to rebuild cod stocks?

[Customs Tariff, February 18th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I listened carefully to the speech of my colleague from Louis-Hébert. First of all, I want to congratulate and to thank him. His speech was very interesting because his arguments confirmed those I developed in my own speech, arguments to the effect that the general preferential tariff can be profitable for developing countries.

Of course, Canada considers this general preferential tariff to be part of its assistance program to developing countries. However, the question is this: Can this tariff have an adverse impact on the Canadian market? I said a moment ago, and the minister has made the same point before, that the government intends to consult Canadian manufacturers on their position so that they do not find themselves at a disadvantage because some products have easier access to the Canadian market thanks to the general preferential tariff.

Of course, the general preferential tariff represents a plus, an important asset, for developing countries that would like to export their production overseas, particularly to Canada.

Here is my question: What are the advantages or disadvantages of this general preferential tariff for Canada?

[Customs Tariff, February 18th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, perhaps I may start by greeting my colleague, the Secretary of State for International Financial Institutions, who tabled this bill on January 31 on behalf of the Minister of Finance. Aside from the debate on the motion presented by the Reform Party last week, when I had the pleasure of making a presentation which dealt partly with international financial institutions, and in fact just before the secretary of state gave his speech, this is the first time he and I will have an opportunity to work together in the House.

He will be pleased to hear that we are probably on the same wave length regarding the general implications of the bill before the House today, and I hope this will be only the first of many such occasions.

I would now like to comment more directly on Bill C-5 which the House is being asked to consider and on the context that makes it so important, namely, export development assistance for developing countries.

This is a very short bill. It contains only one section, whose purpose is to extend for ten years-until June 30, 2004-the expiry date for the general preferential tariff applied by Canada to developing countries. Since the various provisions of the GPT have already been explained in detail by the secretary of state, I do not think I have anything to add in that respect. The bill amends section 45 of the Customs Tariff, under which the GPT was to expire on June 30 this year.

However, the government reserves the right to change subsequently, by order of the Governor in Council, the expiry date of the extension, the rate of duty provided under the GPT and the treatment given certain goods and certain countries.

Although not impressive in size, Bill C-5 has a considerable impact through what it actually does.

I may recall that in the early seventies Canada, like all industrialized countries, introduced preferential tariff treatment for developing countries. The purpose of this measure was to promote the economic growth of these countries by developing their trade with Canada.

Every 10 years, parliamentarians are asked to consider another ten-year extension for a measure that costs little and provides a form of indirect aid to developing countries. In this respect, the Bloc Quebecois reiterates its support for measures that promote international development.

The provisions of this bill ultimately provide an attractive market for the products of developing countries, removing the dependency that conventional development aid will sometimes create. This is positive aid that helps these countries develop goods for export and promotes their integration and participation in international trade, which is expected to intensify in the years to come. That is why the Official Opposition intends to support this bill.

Canada has acquired an excellent reputation for development assistance, through the expertise and activities of non-governmental organizations dedicated to international development. We must continue this tradition, and I want to take this opportunity to say that a sovereign Quebec will be guided by the same concern for international equity.

All of us have been exposed, from time to time, to the usual series of statistics that point to wide gaps in economic development and in the availability of basic resources ensuring a minimum quality of life, which is the case in many countries on this planet. More than one billion people or one-fifth of the world's population earn less than one U.S. dollar per day, comparable to a wage level that existed in Europe and the United States at the end of the eighteenth century. In the eighties, the per capita income of developing countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa declined, in real terms.

However, there is light at the end of the tunnel, and there are some indications that development programs can produce substantial positive results.

The average per capita income in developing countries, for example, has doubled over the last three decades, which is a rate of growth higher than in Great Britain during the industrial revolution, or in the United States in the 19th century, or even in Japan between the two world wars. Turkey, for instance, doubled its per capita income over a period of 20 years, from 1957 to 1977. Brazil made it in 18 years, from 1961 to 1979; South Korea in 11 years, from 1966 to 1977; and China in 10 years, from 1977 to 1987.

Infant mortality has been reduced by half and life expectancy has been pushed ahead 10 years on average. A child born in Shanghai is less likely to die before reaching one year of age and more likely to learn how to read and to live longer than a child born in New York.

Despite these very encouraging statistics, major differences and unacceptable inequalities continue to exist and in some cases to increase. It is therefore necessary to maintain our efforts in order to promote development in the countries which do not enjoy the great conditions we have here.

Clearly, magic formulas to achieve development in the Third World exist by the million.

Just think of the drastic measures advocated by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund in order to bring structural changes to the macro-economic policies of these countries, even though they are very often accompanied by a worsening of already serious social problems.

Some experts insist on growth of local savings, while others favour a massive involvement of government in some sectors of the economy.

Others advise a total or partial closing off of the country to imports, in order to generate economic growth from the inside.

Finally, there are some who believe that opening the economies of developing countries to the world is, in the long run, the best way to achieve development. The abolition or reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the adoption of measures to promote exports would be some of the roads to development.

Such measures would only ensure these countries do not remain mere observers of this tremendous phenomenon called market globalization. As for us, we must realize that we have everything to gain from a reduction of the dependence of these countries and from their involvement in, and contribution to the increasing world trade.

Therefore, I believe that one of the ways we have to encourage development in these countries is to open up our markets to their goods and services. This is why, in my opinion, Bill C-5 is a valid contribution to developing countries.

Some of these countries have already made the strategic choice of promoting export growth to improve their economic development. Results have been outstanding in most cases.

This strategic choice was made in the sixties by South Korea and Taiwan, and in the seventies by Thailand. These countries are living proof of the value of such a strategy.

Originally, the three countries had the social and economic characteristics we observe in several developing countries and those are a large and growing population, a low level of investment and an economy largely based on agriculture.

In less than three decades, they achieved an absolutely stunning rate of growth, along with some other countries in the region.

This phenomenal success is the result, among other things, of two strategic choices, one that I just mentioned, which is the implementation of export-driven policies, and manpower training as a major priority.

In this regard, Quebec is particularly sensitive to the importance of implementing a manpower policy which is consistent, flexible, structured and effective.

At the beginning of the sixties and until the early seventies, South Korea and Taiwan launched a very aggressive strategy of economic growth based on export promotion. A lot of incentives were made accessible to industry in areas that, today, we call soft sectors, for example textiles, clothing and shoes.

Following the difficult 1970s, these two countries emerged with leading annual growth rates of nearly 10 per cent between 1985 and 1991. They also succeeded in diversifying their production in favour of goods with a higher value added.

An interesting parallel can also be drawn with certain Latin American countries. Before the 1980s, countries of Latin America would have been hard pressed to pass for champions of free trade. Quite the contrary, in fact.

Most of them had adopted trade policies aimed at protecting their domestic market from foreign competition, instead of policies which would have allowed domestic firms to exploit their comparative advantages on foreign markets.

However, in the early 1970s, a number of Third World countries and many Latin American countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Peru, experienced a debt crisis. Consequently, with the blessing of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, these countries were compelled to adopt outward-looking policies, lowered tariff barriers, introduced import permits and quotas and adopted export promotion measures.

During the 1980s, several Latin American countries rid themselves of dictatorial regimes and replaced them with democratically elected governments. Contrary to all expectations, these governments managed to survive and, in most cases, are still around today.

Conditions in several countries in this region, chief among them Mexico and Chile, appear favourable to very significant economic growth. It comes as no surprise, then, that the adherence of other Latin American countries to NAFTA has aroused considerable interest.

It should be noted, however, that the world trading system still has some shortcomings which impede the economic growth of developing countries.

According to the OECD, sectors such as agriculture and textiles which represented the strength of many developing countries after World War II, have in no time become the target of protectionist measures imposed by industrialized countries.

As paradoxical as it may seem, the beneficial effects of development assistance policies implemented by industrialized countries have often largely cancelled out by the protectionist trade measures theses very same countries have adopted.

Under GATT, agriculture was excluded de facto from the usual applicable rules, thereby allowing industrialized countries to protect their domestic market through the imposition of tariffs and quotas.

Moreover, industrialized countries have not hesitated to subsidize their agricultural surpluses around the world, pulling the rug out from under developing countries in the process and often rendering the latter's domestic production uncompetitive. With your permission, I would like to quote an excerpt from an OECD report released last year which states the following: "Exports of Latin American agricultural products have also been affected by the high levels of agricultural production within OECD countries as well as by the ever-increasing level of subsidies. In some cases, agricultural exports from developing countries have been squeezed out of profitable markets by highly subsidized exports from industrialized countries".

Furthermore, the tariff system in place in industrialized nations penalizes imports of processed products by giving the advantage to raw materials and other unprocessed products. Developing countries would be at a disadvantage if they wanted to diversify their economies and begin producing value added products.

The success of the recent GATT negotiations should make life easier for exporters in Third World countries, particularly exporters of agricultural products, clothing and textiles. The elimination of tariff barriers on a growing number of products from tropical countries, along with the dismantling in ten years' time of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, which will be included under the GATT rules, should also be a boost to Third World countries.

However, over the last decade or so, we have been witnessing, unfortunately, a resurgence in trade protectionism. New forms of protectionism, such as orderly market sharing agreements, voluntary restrictions on exports and other quota measures, have been introduced. Automobiles, semi-conductors and steel have been targeted, along with other industries which successfully lobbied for protectionist measures.

These measures add to those already in place for textile, clothing and agricultural products. Anti-dumping measures, so-called temporary safeguard measures and accusations of unfair trade practices are popping up everywhere these days.

Canada, as we know, is certainly not immune from this insidious and looming return to protectionism, particularly from its main trade partner, the United States, which is the market for almost 80 per cent of its exports. Our trade problems with the United States, especially with beer, steel, magnesium, softwood lumber and agricultural products, constantly remind us that free trade benefits are fragile and that we must watch our trade partners' practices more closely.

Economic development formulas vary between countries. Export promotion strategies are not, by themselves, a panacea. Although they are important, there is no question that other measures must also be contemplated.

People's happiness is not necessarily contingent on increased individual purchasing power. We must allow societies to develop at their own pace without forcing them to conform to the economic development model dictated by market forces. It is a decision that these societies must make for themselves. It is, however, important and even essential to contribute to these countries' economic growth by giving them preferential access to our markets.

Promoting the growth of developing countries' exports to industrialized nations is therefore a most commendable goal. The Bloc Quebecois does not deny it, of course. But if I may, I would like to outline a number of concerns we, on this side of the House, have about the practical application of the general preferential tariff.

We must first of all recognize that the countries that currently benefit the most from the general preferential tariff are newly industrialized countries, mainly the new economic powers of Southeast Asia. These are not, strictly speaking, third world or developing countries.

Furthermore, China and Indonesia, for instance, which are the beneficiaries of 38 per cent and 3 per cent respectively of Canadian preferential tariffs, are regularly censured for their repeated violations of human rights.

As the purpose of the general preferential tariff is to help real developing countries to grow, without hurting the Canadian economy in the process, we should be entitled to a more in-depth study of products and countries benefiting from the general preferential tariff.

This brings us to question the relevance of maintaining the general preferential tariff for developing countries that have since become newly industrialized nations. As a result, we must determine if these countries still meet the criteria allowing us to define what is a developing country, which, we agree, can be very complex.

In the cases concerning us, we should ask whether newly industrialized countries such as Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore should still get preferential treatment. If all industrialized countries decided to take away from these countries preferential tariffs generally extended to developing nations, this could impact on their treatment by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or regional development banks.

One must know that the United States no longer gives preferential tariff treatment to South Korea and Hong Kong. Japan, Canada and the European Community, for their part, have still not made a decision on this issue.

The federal government has already announced its intention to study how desirable it would be to continue to extend the general preferential tariff to countries that have reached a high level of economic development. In fact, such a study is unavoidable in preparation for the meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to be held in 1995, precisely about the general preferential tariff. Now that the Uruguay Round is over, the government has also announced its intention to review, and probably reduce, the extent of the general preferential tariff.

In addition, we know that the government intends to consult with Canadian manufacturers before making any decision on the general preferential tariff, a move that we wholeheartedly endorse.

It goes without saying, however, that any change to the general preferential tariff as it applies to any product or country could have major political repercussions.

Taking the general preferential tariff away from South Korea or any other newly industrialized country could lead to a deterioration in our trade relations with them since they may not like what Canada is doing.

The case of China, which has nearly 40 per cent of Canada's preferential tariffs, could also arise. Like the United States, which is wondering whether it should now deny most favored nation status to China, mainly because of the repeated violations of human rights in that country, Canada could show how important it considers human rights to be by also considering withdrawing the general preferential tariff from all countries that blatantly violate these rights.

In that the government has said many times that it intends to involve Parliament in Canada's foreign policy, and since any change in the scope of the general preferential tariff is likely to have political repercussions, would the government agree to consider the possibility of consulting parliamentarians, as well as Canadian manufacturers, before changing any component whatever of the general preferential tariff and if necessary amend this bill along those lines?

Such a consultation could proceed in a flexible and efficient manner through the Standing Committee on Finance or the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Be that as it may, I eagerly await the government's response to this suggestion, which I am making as a request, in view of the importance which the government claims to attach to the opinion and judgment of parliamentarians.

I close by reiterating our total support for the basic principles underlying the extension of the general preferential tariff for the so-called developing countries. At the same time, I also reiterate my concerns and questions about applying this tariff to the newly industrialized countries and to developing countries which openly violate human rights.

I trust that the government will follow up our request for prior consultation with parliamentarians before any change is made to the general preferential tariff structure.

[Defence Policy, February 17th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, listening to my hon. colleague, I hear a lot of things I never said. First of all, I would like to say that I went out of my way to point out that such a debate was highly desirable, and highly praiseworthy, but that we cannot have a discussion just for the sake of it. To have any productive discussion, we need a policy paper to give a direction to the debate.

When we had the debate on whether Canadian peacekeepers should stay in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia, and the debate on allowing further cruise missile testing in Canada, we, on this side of the House, criticized not the relevance of the debate nor its very nature, but the fact that the debate was going on before the government had presented its overall policy or the general direction of its defence policy.

My hon. colleague is quite right when he says that cruise missile testing and peacekeeping are part of Canada's overall defence policy. Consequently, as far as we are concerned, it is totally illogical to proceed backwards and, as I said before, put the cart before the horse by debating certain specific aspects of the defence policy before we even had a chance to discuss that policy as a whole.

In view of such criticism, we thought that the government had gotten the message. Obviously, it has not. It is back today with this debate on Canada's defence policy, without any policy paper or guidelines, except for this short paper we were given only this morning.

I think that we should have received this document much earlier so that we could have been apprised of the government's concerns and questions regarding defence policy. They only gave it to us this morning. How are we expected to have a

worthwhile debate under such conditions? What I was criticizing in this debate was not its relevance but the way it is taking place.

[Defence Policy, February 17th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, the government is inviting us today to a third debate on Canadian defence policy. Going against all logic, the government started this series of debates by asking the House to reflect on two special aspects of such a policy, namely the role of Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia, and the

testing of cruise missiles over Canadian territory, before letting us know the general direction of its intended defence policy.

Today, without any warning, the government is asking the House to debate the main thrusts of our new defence policy using as a base a vague and general document which has been handed out to members at the very last minute. Moreover, the government assumes that a defence policy can be considered independently from foreign policy, which is not the case. There again, the government carefully avoided to unveil its intentions regarding the direction it will give to this new foreign policy.

However, since we must accept the general format decided upon by the government for this debate, I will say that we first need to put this question in the general geopolitical context of the day, because it is this context which determines the choices Canada will have to make when defining its defence policy.

It might be useful to recall that at the end of the second world war, the world split in two distinct blocs, the western bloc and the eastern bloc, which set up two competing military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, that Canada joined in 1949, and the Warsaw pact.

At the end of the cold war, toward the end of the eighties, this polarized political situation changed drastically. The Warsaw pact dissolved, leaving NATO without any apparent rival. Therefore, western countries do not seem to be facing any readily identifiable threat. World stability is no longer the result of a balance of power between two groups. New nuclear powers are gradually emerging, and they often are politically unstable. Under such circumstances, it became difficult for Canada and its allies to question the collective security system which had determined their defence policy during the cold war.

On another level, the decreased influence of the east bloc countries and Russia on international issues had a direct impact on the political and military stability in several regions of the planet. Yugoslavia and the ex-Soviet republics are the most striking examples of that.

Some regions have also tried to take advantage of the new division of strategic powers to assert their political and military presence in their part of the world. The Persian Gulf war remains the most striking case, in line with the new configuration of global politics.

In response to the emerging political balance, NATO countries reviewed and then modified their defence policies. The same process went on in Canada and, in 1992, the government presented a new political statement to replace Perrin Beatty's white paper dating back to 1987.

The defence policy of western countries was readjusted in several ways. First, the most important measure in my view was to reduce the defence budgets; since exterior threats were no longer comparable to those that prevailed during the cold war, defence did not require as many resources as it did in the past. The armaments industry was affected directly by that readjustment because its markets shrunk considerably. In arms producing countries, hundreds of thousands of people were laid off and Canada was no exception.

Second, on a more strategic level, was the review of potential sources of outside threats. Under the new international order, the danger of an east-west conflict has greatly diminished. The new dangers, as identified by NATO members, stem from the regional conflicts which have been emerging in various parts of the world over the last few years. Canada shares this point of view, as attested by its 1992 policy statement.

Third, the political and strategic mandates of the major international organizations are being totally redefined. The UN and NATO are two cases in point.

The United Nations organization, through the Security Council, is increasingly being asked to take action in conflicts arising in various parts of the world. The latest ones, the gulf war and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, herald new trends which have a significant impact on the national defence policy of western nations.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for its part, seems to be willing to take on a much bigger role since the disintegration of the Warsaw pact. Originally designed to ensure the mutual defence of its member countries, NATO is now seeking to modify its defence mandate in the north Atlantic to become more closely associated with the United Nations organization, as its military arm whose role would be to enforce the mandates given the UN by the Security Council.

This trend is reflected in negotiations on the use of air strikes against Serbian troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

As a member of two major international organizations, NATO and the UN, Canada cannot and must not withdraw from discussions on these issues. The international situation is very unstable, and it would be extremely dangerous to renege on our international commitments.

As you know, Canada does not have the necessary resources to provide for the security and full defence of its vast territory.

This given has had a decisive factor in Canada's defence policy for several decades, as can be seen by this country's participation in joint security systems established through NATO and NORAD. It would also be unrealistic to think Canada is not affected by changes in the global political situation. We must realize that Canada can play a strategic role at the international level and, in return, rely on its international

alliances to guarantee the security of its territory. That was the gist of the 1992 policy statement.

The statement replaced the 1987 white paper which, as I said earlier, was drafted in a cold war context. The new defence policy was intended as an adjustment to the new international situation. It pointed out the risks that continued to exist from a strategic point of view, despite the collapse of the Warsaw pact, and perhaps I may quote the following:

The nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union remain sufficient to devastate this continent. At a time of ongoing instability in the Commonwealth of Independent States, prudence requires that we take these capabilities into account in the formulation our defence policy.

The size of our country, its strategic location, and the limited resources that we can devote to defence mean that, for the foreseeable future, Canada will maintain its long-standing relationship with the United States.

Until further notice, this policy statement is still the Canadian government's official policy on national defence. A few adjustments have been made, however, including the renewal of the Canadian-American agreement on cruise missile testing. Furthermore, with its contingent of peacekeepers, Canada has also helped redefine its role within our international institutions.

As far as strategy is concerned, we have seen that the geopolitical context is changing very fast. As I said earlier, this development should not necessarily be interpreted as a portent of a new era of peace. The carnage taking place in various parts of the world should give us some indication that is not the case.

It would be illogical to think that just because the world is no longer divided into east and west as it was after World War II, we should abandon our role within the joint security systems.

The concept of threat should not be perceived only as being inherently linked to the concept of territory. Should the conflict in the former Yugoslavia spread beyond its borders, for example, Europe and NATO would be directly involved. The catastrophic consequences of such a scenario are serious enough to make us realize how important it is to have a defence policy which is not only intended to protect the territory of Canada or Quebec, but also takes into consideration the security of our strategic and traditional allies.

During the last election, and many times since October 25, the Bloc Quebecois has reaffirmed its support for cuts in the budget of the Department of National Defence. Despite the international context I have just described, we believe that we could cut that budget by some 25 per cent without dramatically impairing the operations of that important department.

Reducing the budget of the Department of National Defence by 25 per cent does not mean that we should withdraw from our obligations. On the contrary. The Bloc Quebecois is not advocating the total elimination of all major equipment procurement programs, though we believe some should perhaps be abandoned.

These programs remain important if Canada is to live up to its international commitments, but the rapid changes on the political scene worldwide make it necessary for western countries to redefine their defence policies on an ongoing basis. Canada is no different.

A new government has been elected and it is now its responsibility to propose new directions, in terms of defence, that can adequately address these rapid and fundamental changes that are occurring throughout the world. In this regard, you will note that the Liberal Party of Canada had already stated some of its positions while sitting on this side of the House, in the opposition, and during the last election campaign.

But it is worth pointing out, Mr. Speaker, that this is not the first time that the Liberal Party sends conflicting and unclear messages about its defence policy. Let me just remind you that, in the early seventies, under Pierre Trudeau, the Canadian government tried at first to distinguish itself from its American neighbour, but later, in the early eighties, its positions got considerably closer to the Americans'. As evidence of this, it is interesting to note that it is the Pierre Elliott Trudeau administration that first authorized cruise missile testing on Canadian soil in 1983.

Let me also remind you that Prime Minister Trudeau had taken on an international peace mission while at the time increasing considerably national defence budgets and authorizing the purchase of sophisticated equipment in order to support Canadian defence policy. I am thinking, for instance, about the acquisition of CF-18s and the first order for new frigates intended for the Canadian navy.

While sitting in the opposition, the Liberal Party often blamed the Conservative government for being too conciliatory with the United States. It did not keep the Liberal Party from reaffirming its support for the cruise missile tests last January, even though many of the top members of the party had objected to such tests. It is not easy therefore to anticipate what the main orientations of the government will be on the issue of national defence.

Yet, on a political level, it is important that we make sure the government determines in the very near future the thrust of new defence and foreign affairs policies that will be credible, clear and feasible.

It is too late to go on listing platitudes like they have been doing in the red book until now. The Liberal Party is in office; it must act responsibly and stop pretending it is consulting people

in order to gain time. Consultation is definitely a good thing, but it does not relieve the government from its obligation to reveal its intentions and the general principles of the policies it wants to implement. Discussion is valuable only if it is based on solid grounds.

The House of Commons is now in its third emergency debate on issues that are not supported by an honest and concrete national defence policy. What is even worse is that those debates do not seem to lead to any well defined policy.

Such an attitude is totally inappropriate. At this stage of the discussion, we denounce resorting to emergency debates on a national defence policy when the government has not even presented its new white paper on the subject.

I also seriously question the creation of a joint committee of the House and of the Senate to study and define the direction Canada's new defence policy should take. I doubt it is pertinent and financially sound as an operating procedure.

Since there is already a House standing committee which has been given the mandate to study defence issues, we believe a joint committee would only duplicate its efforts, with all the expected drawbacks as far as efficiency and cost effectiveness are concerned. We think the government must avoid such expensive practices which only go to demonstrate that the Senate of Canada is useful and its existence fully justified. This inference alone should lead us to question the relevance of keeping this antiquated and archaic institution.

[Patrick Tremblay Foundation, February 16th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of National Revenue. On February 11 last, I called the attention of this House to the case of the young Patrick Tremblay who is fighting a severe form of cancer. This young man has to undergo expensive treatment available only in Texas.

To raise money to pay for his treatment, a foundation has been set up. This foundation, we are told, will go on helping other people in a similar situation after Patrick is cured. Unfortunately, the Department of National Revenue is delaying granting the accreditation application that would enable this foundation to issue income tax receipts.

My question is the following: Is the minister aware that any further delay in accrediting such a foundation is endangering not only Mr. Tremblay's life but also the lives of all Quebecers and Canadians who suffer from the same disease and who could benefit from the assistance provided by this foundation?

[Winter Olympics, February 16th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, it is with pride and great pleasure that I rise today in this House on my own behalf and on behalf on my colleague from Saint-Jean to stress the dazzling performance by skaters Isabelle Brasseur and Lloyd Eisler who won the bronze medal in the pairs figure skating category yesterday at the Lillehammer Olympic Games.

Isabelle Brasseur and Lloyd Eisler were bronze medallists at the Albertville Olympic Games, have been the Canadian champions for several years and hold the world champions title. Their impressive record is due to their exceptionally hard work and determination.

After giving this wonderful performance and winning this beautiful medal, Isabelle Brasseur and Lloyd Eisler are now putting an end to their successful career at the amateur level. These two champions, who train at the Haute Performance Centre in Boucherville, will now enter a professional career that promises to be as successful.

To these two champions who thrilled Quebec and Canada and who so often filled us with pride, and earned our admiration, I say congratulations and good luck on behalf of Quebec and Canada.

[supply, February 11th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I hope that you will give me time to answer this long question.

First, I think that, like his colleague from Kootenay East, the hon. member for St. Albert did not catch the drift of what I said. I focused on international financial institutions just to show how pointless it was to make the motion as specific, as restrictive as they did, because the Auditor General included in his report last year measures relating to international financial institutions that have had practically no effect thus far. This is to say that focusing on certain areas of the very partial report of the Auditor General is not conducive to a global solution.

The other point my hon. colleague made was: how do we, of the Bloc, think that our marvellous committee is going to solve all the problems of this country? It is no panacea. In itself, creating a committee does not solve the problems, but this committee would identify the areas were costly duplication exists, not only costly duplication but also squandering and extravagant expenditures. After having identified all this, we would be able to take action on the various unnecessary, superfluous expenditures.

The last question my colleague asked me was: why insist so much on eliminating duplication? Are there reasons to believe that everything will work out for the best in our beautiful Canada just because duplication will have been eliminated? Of course not, but the fact remains that-based on figures from serious sources, not the Bloc Quebecois but a serious economist

like Mr. Fortin, as well as the Bélanger-Campeau Commission-duplication between Quebec and Canada alone costs from $2 to $3 billion a year. Perhaps savings could be made in that area by cutting unnecessary government expenditures, would you not say?

[supply, February 11th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I believe I will have an opportunity during my speech to answer some of the questions asked by my colleague from Kootenay East. I have the feeling that he does not understand very well the point we have been trying to make in this House for the past few days. I will try to answer his comments and questions.

First, I would like to thank my colleague from St. Albert, who sits behind me, for putting this motion to the House. I would say at the outset that the motion he presented today pursues a very laudable objective that we wholly support, and that is putting public finances on a sound footing.

However, I believe the motion is too specific and therefore too restrictive. What I mean by that is that the motion presented by my colleague from St. Albert focuses on a few recommendations, a few items in the last report of the Auditor General. But, as we know, the Auditor General does not have the resources or the mandate to review all aspects of federal government activities.

Consequently, the Auditor General selects for review, every year, a limited number of government activities. The motion of the hon. member for St. Albert does not refer to the previous report of the Auditor General, and I will come back to that later, even though its recommendations might still not have been implemented.

The motion of the hon. member for St. Albert does not mention either any area of government activity not yet reviewed in detail by the Auditor General. What I am trying to say is that the points raised by my colleague are rather restrictive, and this is why the Bloc Quebecois has some reservations.

In our opinion, there are three main categories of causes which account for the present financial problems of the federal government. First, there are extraneous causes, by that I mean the difficult situation we are in, everywhere. That difficult situation results in a lowering of tax revenues and an increase in social spending for the government. What can we do on that front? I believe that we should promote job creation in order to revitalize the economy.

The second category of causes for the financial problems of the federal government are of a more structural nature. We mentioned several times in our speeches the very nature of the Canadian federal system. The sprinkling of federal money from coast to coast in order not to offend sensitivities in the various regions is very inefficient and very costly for the federal government.

There is also the costly and paralysing duplication-in terms of money and economic development-we have mentioned frequently in this House. It is inherent to the present federal system. There is very little we can do in that area until the constitutional make-up of the country is amended.

There is a third category of causes that I would call functional, and they involve the waste and mismanagement of public funds. This is what we are talking about at the present time. Now we have to clean up the government's finances, and that is what has been holding the parliamentarians' attention since the beginning of this session.

We know there are not many recipes for cleaning up government finances. There are basically two recipes, one of which is to increase government revenues. But we know that the middle class, which is already carrying a very heavy tax burden, cannot carry more. So, what we are proposing on this side is to target the tax loopholes that allow our more fortunate fellow citizens to avoid making the contribution that they should to give their fair share.

The other major recipe is to reduce spending. It is that point, I think, that our friends from the Reform Party have trouble with and are getting bogged down because when we talk about reducing spending, we cannot cut everywhere in an anarchic, disorganized way. We must be able to target. Target what? The waste of money, the expensive duplications, the extravagant and superfluous spending. That is where we should be targeting.

I now refer to the comments that were made earlier by my colleague from Kootenay-East. He was saying: Indeed, that is what we are suggesting we cut. But the proposal is to target specific areas, and that is what I was saying earlier. What we are proposing, as my colleague from Kootenay East was saying, is to identify first the tax and budgetary expenditures that should perhaps be cut. We have to identify them first. As a means of doing that, we propose that a special committee of the House be struck, with a mandate to examine all the tax and budgetary expenditures of the federal government, item by item.

This proposal should not surprise the hon. member for Kootenay East since two of his colleagues from the Reform Party, namely the hon. member for Calgary North in response to a question I put to him on January 21 and the hon. member for Lethbridge in response to a question put to him by my colleague from Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot on February 1, made it known that they would totally agree with the creation of such a committee. I think that we have to go ahead with this proposal and strike a committee that would examine all the tax and budgetary expenditures of the federal government, otherwise we may see, in the next budget and in subsequent budgets, the same mistakes that caused the problems that Canada is facing right now. We must not make the same mistakes. We must target and root out all lavish and excessive public spending as well as costly duplication and waste.

At the beginning of my presentation, I referred to previous reports from the Auditor General which raised interesting points, although no follow-up action has yet been taken. I note the presence in this House of the Secretary of State responsible for International Financial Institutions, which brings me to the 1992 report of the Auditor General. Chapter 12 dealt with Canada's participation in the Bretton Woods Institutions and in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Of all countries, Canada has one of the highest per capita contribution levels when it comes to funding projects of institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Canada's subscription or quota at the IMF is $4.6 billion, while financial commitments in the World Bank Group and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are $5.6 billion. One troubling fact, as the Auditor General recalled in last year's report, is that these sums of money are not subject to any

controls or cost-effectiveness or impact studies by the House of Commons.

Lamenting this sad state of affairs, the Auditor General recommends that the government undertake a periodic review and assessment of the objectives, extent, costs and results of Canada's participation in these institutions. To date, no follow-up action to speak of has been taken as far as this recommendation is concerned. And this is what we are talking about.

The Bloc Quebecois is determined to see to it that the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of all federal government spending is evaluated. It is imperative that such an evaluation be conducted in all areas identified by the Auditor General and for all government spending items.

Of course, Canada must continue to make substantial contributions to international financial institutions. The Bloc Quebecois has no quarrel with this. However, Canada's international development assistance objectives need to be clearly stated.

The sizeable amounts of money that Canada contributes to international development assistance should also be closely evaluated to ensure that the contribution process is as cost-effective as possible. This is the thrust of the recommendation that we have been making for several weeks and months now, namely that a committee be struck. A response on the part of the government is urgently needed.